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S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 4 USNATO 3687

E.O. 1165): GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR - AUGUST 3 COUNCIL DISCUSSION OF SUBSTANTIVE ASPECTS

REF: A) STATE 152826; B) STATE 152750

SUMMARY: AUGUST 3 COUNCIL DISCUSSION OF U.S., BELGIAN AND UK PAPERS ON SUBSTANTIVE ASPECTS OF MBFR PRODUCED BROAD AGREEMENT THAT U.S. PAPER WOULD SERVE AS BASIS FOR DEVELOPMENT OF ALLIED POSITION, WITH OTHER TWO PAPERS GIVEN IMPORTANT, BUT SUBORDINATE ROLES. RUMSFELD DREW ON REFTELS AND CIRCULATED FULL TEXT OF COMMENTS. GENERAL REACTION TO U.S. PROPOSAL FOR SPC MANDATE (USNATO 3644) WAS ALSO FAVORABLE. AMONG PROBLEMS STRESSED BY OTHER DELEGATIONS WERE IMPACT OF MBFR PROPOSALS ON SECURITY OF FLANKS, NEED FOR AGREED DATA BASE, LINK BETWEEN FIRST AND SECOND PHASES OF MBFR, USE OF COMMON CEILING CONCEPT, AND METHOD FOR ENSURING INPUT OF NATO MILITARY AUTHORITIES IN FURTHER MBFR WORK. SPC WILL MEET ON MBFR AUGUST 7, AT WHICH TIME U.S. MANDATE WILL
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SERVE AS INFORMAL BASIS FOR DISCUSSION. ACTION REQUESTED: WE WOULD APPRECIATE WASHINGTON GUIDANCE ON QUESTIONS RAISED BY OTHER DELEGATIONS AT AUGUST 3 MEETING FOR USE AT EARLY SPC MEETING. END SUMMARY.

1. RUMSFELD OPENED DISCUSSION BY CLARIFYING POSITION OF FRG TERRITORIAL FORCES IN DATA BASE OF JULY 27 U.S. PAPER PER PARA 7, REF B. HE THEN DREW EXTENSIVELY ON GUIDANCE REFTELS AND CIRCULATED FULL TEXT OF U.S. COMMENTS.

2. DANISH PERMREP (SVART) NOTED THAT COPENHAGEN FOUND U.S. PAPER "VALUABLE BASIS FOR NATO WORK" AND STRESSED ITS LOGICAL AND SIMPLE PRESENTATION, WHICH HE SAID COULD BE USED TO STRENGTHEN PUBLIC UNDERSTANDING OF NATO POSITION. HE FOUND U.S. DATA "REASONABLE" AND SAID THAT MC/14/3 CONCEPT WOULD NOT BE ALTERED BY IMPLEMENTATION OF U.S. MBFR PROPOSAL. HE THEN POSED THREE QUESTIONS ON U.S. PAPER:

(1) IS IT U.S. HOPE TO AVOID DISCUSSION OF AGENDA AND PROCEDURAL POINTS AT OPENING OF MBFR NEGOTIATIONS SO THAT IN EFFECT MAIN POINTS OF NATO PROPOSAL WOULD BECOME AN AGENDA? RUMSFELD RESPONDED THAT U.S. PAPER DID NOT PREJUDGE THIS QUESTION SINCE IT DID NOT FIX A TIME FOR PRESENTATION OF ALLIED PROPOSAL AND SIMPLY STATED "EARLY" PRESENTATION OF PROPOSAL WAS NEEDED. HE SAID TIMING WOULD OBVIOUSLY BE QUESTION FOR FURTHER ALLIED DISCUSSION.

(2) IS IT THE U.S. VIEW THAT ALLIES MUST SECURE WARSAW PACT ACCEPTANCE OF COMMON CEILING CONCEPT PRIOR TO AGREEMENT ON FIRST PHASE REDUCTIONS? RUMSFELD NOTED THAT SUBJECT HAD BEEN DISCUSSED BEFORE AND RECALLED HIS PREVIOUS RESPONSE. HE SAID HE UNDERSTOOD U.S. POSITION TO BE THAT WHILE ALLIES WOULD AGREE TO ADVANCE CONCEPT OF COMMON CEILING, WARSAW PACT'S KY WITH THE CONCEPT NOT NECESSARILY REQUIRED DURING NEGOTIATIONS ON FIRST PHASE.

(3) IT APPEARS FROM U.S. PAPER THAT AREAS OF CONSTRAINTS AND REDUCTIONS COINCIDED. WHAT IN U.S. VIEW WOULD MILITATE AGAINST EXTENSION OF CONSTRAINTS ZONE TO ADJACENT AREAS? RUMSFELD REPLIED THAT THIS WAS A QUESTION WHICH HE WOULD PREFER TO DEAL WITH LATER WHEN ADDITIONAL U.S. INPUT ON THIS POINT WAS INTRODUCED.

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3. ITALIAN REP (BETTINI) STATED ROME'S ACCEPTANCE OF U.S. PROPOSAL FOR SPC MANDATE AND ITALIAN DESIRE REACH AGREEMENT MBFR POSITION AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. TURNING FIRST TO BELGIAN PAPER, BETTINI SAID ROME SAW IT AS USEFUL EFFORT AT SYNTHESIS OF OPTIONS IN APRIL 30 U.S. PAPER. HE WELCOMED BELGIAN PAPER'S USE OF 10 PER CENT TARGET FOR OVERALL REDUCTIONS AND FACT THAT IT LEFT TO ALLIES RIGHT TO DECIDE WHICH NATIONAL FORCES WOULD BE REDUCED IN SECOND STAGE. HOWEVER, ROME OBJECTED TO CLOSE LINK BETWEEN FIRST AND SECOND PHASES IN BELGIAN PAPER. BETTINI ARGUED THAT PHASES MUST BE AUTONOMOUS AND THAT IT WAS IN "EUROPEAN INTEREST" SIMPLY TO INDICATE WILLINGNESS DISCUSS SECOND PHASE. USING A PERCENTAGE FIGURE, HE ARGUED, WOULD BE TANTAMOUNT TO AN AGREEMENT TO REDUCE FORCES DURING SECOND PHASE AND COULD WEAKEN MOVE TOWARD

EUROPEAN UNIFICATION. BETTINI WELCOMED U.S. PAPER AS "EXTREMELY IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTION DESERVING OF POSITIVE ANALYSIS." U.S. PAPER, HE SAPD, COMBINES BEST ELEMENTS OF OPTIONS ONE AND TWO OF U.S. APRIL 30 PAPER, PROPERLY HOLDING THIRD OPTION IN RESERVE. U.S. CORRECTIONS IN DATA BASE, IN ITALIAN VIEW, ARE HELPFUL IN THAT THEY GIVE GOOD BASIS FOR MOVE TOWARD NEW MILITARY EQUILIBRIUM. BETTINI SAID ROME REGARDS OVERALL 10 PERCENT REDUCTION ON BOTH SIDES AS FAIR RESULT BUT STRESSED THAT THIS FIGURE SHOULD NOT BE USED WITH WARSAW PACT SINCE FIRST AND SECOND PHASES MUST BE SEEN INDEPENDENTLY. HE WELCOMED U.S. PAPER'S EMPHASIS ON REDUCTION OF ONE SOVIET TANK ARMY DURING FIRST PHASE, ITS AGREEMENT THAT PRE-REDUCTION CONSTRAINTS SHOULD NOT BE PRE-CONDITION TO REDUCTIONS AGREEMENT, ITS "PRUDENT" TREATMENT OF NON-CIRCUMVENTION IN HUNGARY, ITS LEAVING OPEN THE QUESTION OF WHICH EUROPEAN FORCES MIGHT BE REDUCED IN POSSIBLE SECOND PHASE, AND ITS TREATMENT OF COMMON CEILING AS BASIC ELEMENT OF ALLIED APPROACH. IN CONCLUSION, BETTINI SAID THAT ITALIAN MILITARY AUTHORITIES COULD AGREE TO INCLUSION OF U.S. NUCLEAR WEAPONS, IF THIS BECAME ESSENTIAL, PROVIDED ONLY WARHEADS AND NOT DELIVERY SYSTEMS WERE INVOLVED. HE SAID THAT ITALIAN MILITARY AUTHORITIES STRONGLY OPPOSED ANY REDUCTIONS IN UK AND FRENCH TACTICAL NUCLEAR SYSTEMS OR IN U.S. SYSTEMS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN.

4. RECALLING BASIC MBFR GOAL OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY AT LOWER LEVEL OF CONFRONTATION, LUXEMBOURG PERMREP (FISHBACH) WELCOMED UK PAPER'S POSITION THAT ALLIES SHOULD MAKE CLEAR TO SOVIETS FROM OUTSET THAT THEIR FORCE DISPOSITIONS ALONE WERE THREATENING TO WEST. HE AGREED THAT IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT PERSUADE SOVIETS
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TO CHANGE THEIR DISPOSITIONS AND NOTED APPROVINGLY UK PAPER'S SUGGESTION THAT SOVIETS MIGHT NOT APPROACH MBFR TALKS SERIOUSLY BUT SEEK TO STRING THEM OUT INDEFINITELY. FISHBACH WELCOMED INTRODUCE OF COMMON CEILING APPROACH IN U.S. AND BELGIAN PAPERS BUT ARGUED THAT COMMON CEILING WAS NOT SUFFICIENT FOR ALLIED SECURITY, QUOTING IN THIS CONNECTION SECDEF SCHLESINGER'S DPC

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STATEMENT ON LARGE WARSAW PACT ADVANTAGE IN FIREPOWER. ACCORDINGLY, HE ARGUED, COMMON CEILING MUST BE SUPPLEMENTED BY CONCEPT OF "COMBAT CAPABILITY" AND ADDITION OF U.S. THIRD OPTION MAY BE NECESSARY. HE NOTED THAT U.S. PAPER OF JULY 27 TOOK ACCOUNT OF COMBAT CAPABILITY PROBLEM BY CALLING FOR REMOVAL OF SOVIET TANK ARMY. OPTION OF REMOVING ONLY STATIONED FORCES IN MBFR WAS ATTRACTIVE, HE SAID, BUT HAD BAD IMPLICATION OF U.S.-SOVIET BILATERAL DEAL. INTRODUCTION OF INDIGENOUS FORCES ALSO HAD ITS DANGERS, HE ADDED, IN THAT IT COULD GIVE SOVIETS BASIS FOR INTERVENTION IN EUROPEAN MILITARY QUESTIONS. IN THIS RESPECT, FISHBACH WELCOMED BELGIAN PAPER'S SUGGESTION THAT REDUCTION OF EUROPEAN NATIONAL FORCES WITHIN GLOBAL FIGURE WOULD BE AGREED AMONG ALLIES. IN CONCLUSION, FISHBACH REITERATED LUXEMBOURG'S INTENTION NOT TO REDUCE ITS FORCES.

5. TURKISH PERMREP (ERALP) CONCENTRATED ON PROBLEM OF FLANKS, WHICH HE SAID RESULTED FROM FACT THAT ALL THREE SUBSTANTIVE PAPERS SOUGHT TO REDUCE PRESSURES IN CENTRAL EUROPE. SUCH APPROACH
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WAS ACCEPTABLE, HE SAID, IF ACCOMPANIED BY EFFECTIVE MEASURES TO GUARANTEE SECURITY OF ALL, BUT THREE MODELS AS THEY STAND SERVE TO INCREASE THREAT TO FLANKS. HE SAID ANKARA FOUND SECOND U.S. OPTION IN APRIL 30 PAPER "LEAST OBJECTIONABLE" BUT SAID THAT TURKEY COULD GO ALONG WITH ANY OPTION WHICH GUARANTEED UNDIMINISHED SECURITY. TURNING TO U.S. PAPER OF JULY 27, ERALP SUGGESTED THAT ASYMMETRY OF PROPOSED REDUCTIONS COULD TEMPT SOVIETS TO DEMAND CUTS IN FORWARD-BASED SYSTEMS AND REVERT TO CONCEPT OF "STRATEGIC AREA," BRINGING IN FORCES OUTSIDE GUIDELINES AREA. HE FOUND U.S. PAPER INSUFFICIENTLY SPECIFIC ON PROTECTION OF FLANK INTERESTS AND SAID HE WISHED TO ADD TO PARA 19(3)(D) OF U.S. PAPER (ON NON-CIRCUMVENTION) IDEA THAT REDUCTIONS WOULD BE "WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO UNDIMINISHED SECURITY OF ALLIANCE AS A WHOLE."

6. CANADIAN REP (MARSHALL) ADVISED THAT OTTAWA TENTATIVELY FAVORED U.S. APPROACH TO TABLING OUTLINE OF NEGOTIATING PROPOSAL AT OUTSET OF TALKS, WHICH HE SAID WAS PERHAPS ONLY WAY IN WHICH ALLIES COULD STIMULATE MEANINGFUL DIALOGUE WITH OTHER SIDE. OTTAWA FINDS "MANY MERITS," HE SAID, IN U.S. PAPER, WHICH HE DID NOT INTEND TO

LIST, AND ALSO NOTED THREE PROBLEM AREAS:

(1) DATA BASE. CANADIANS STRUCK BY FACT THAT U.S. JULY 27 PAPER GAVE THIRD SET OF FIGURES THIS YEAR ON SOVIET STRENGTH AND BELIEVE THAT AGREEMENT ESSENTIAL ON DATA BASE;

(2) VERIFICATION MEASURES. CANADIANS BELIEVE IF RESTRICTED TO NATIONAL MEANS, VERIFICATION MEASURES WOULD BENEFIT ONLY CERTAIN STATES; AND

(3) COMMON CEILING. U.S. PAPER TREATS THIS IN SUCH A WAY AS TO IMPLY THAT WE WOULD INFORM SOVIETS AT OUTSET THAT BASIC AIM OF NEGOTIATIONS WAS COMMON CEILING. MARSHALL AGAIN STRESSED NEED DEVELOP GOOD PUBLIC POSTURE ON ALLIED MBFR POSITION. TURNING TO UK PAPER, MARSHALL SAID OTTAWA AGREED THAT COMBAT CAPABILITY WAS AN IMPORTANT CONCEPT BUT BELIEVED IT COULD BE USED ONLY INTERNALLY AND NOT WITH PUBLIC OR OTHER SIDE. HE ALSO ASKED WHAT UK DROP USE OF TERM "HONORARY EUROPEANS" WHEN REFERRING TO CANADIAN FORCES AND ASKED WHY SEPARATION INTO "U.S." AND "OTHER NATO" COULD NOT BE USED. TAKING UP MARSHALL'S POINT ON DATA BASE, CHAIRMAN (PANSA) AGREED THAT STUDY WAS NEEDED AND ADVISED THAT IS HAD DEVELOPED COMPUTERIZED DATA BASE FROM NATIONAL INPUTS, EXCEPT FROM U.S. HE SAID IS HOPED HAVE U.S. INPUT SOON IN ORDER HAVE DATA BASE READY BY MID-SEPTEMBER. UK REP (THOMSON) SUGGESTED THAT MID-SEPTEMBER WAS TOO SECRET

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LATE FOR HAVING AGREED DATA BASE.

7. FRG REP (BOSS) SAID BONN REGARDED U.S. PAPER AS IMPORTANT STEP TOWARD AGREED ALLIED POSITION AND WAS PREPARED USE IT AS BASIS FOR FURTHER WORK. BONN WAS PLEASED, HE SAID, THAT CERTAIN FRG POINTS HAD BEEN TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT BY U.S., SPECIFICALLY: (A) CONCEPT THAT TALKS WERE CONTINUUM AND WOULD MOVE FROM FIRST STAGE TO COMMON CEILING; (B) IMPROVEMENT OF DATA BASE; (C) INCLUSION OF CONSTRAINTS AT ALL STAGES; (D) CONCENTRATION ON BASIC WARSAW PACT THREAT, I.E. TANKS; (E) EQUAL TREATMENT OF ALL EUROPEAN FORCES WITH SHARES OF SECOND-STAGE REDUCTIONS DEVELOPED LATER. BOSS NOTED FRG AGREEMENT THAT FIRST STAGE WOULD BE RESTRICTED TO STATIONED FORCES AND CALLED FOR FURTHER STUDY ON LINK BETWEEN FIRST AND SECOND PHASES AND COMMON CEILING. IN FRG VIEW, HE SAID, COMMON CEILING, INCLUDING PRINCIPLE OF REDUCTIONS OF EUROPEAN FORCES, SHOULD BE AGREED DURING FIRST STAGE AND CLOSE LINK BETWEEN FIRST AND SECOND PHASES MUST BE MADE CLEAR. WERE THIS NOT DONE, GERMANS FEAR THAT WARSAW PACT MIGHT ATTEMPT AVOID SECOND PHASE ENTIRELY SINCE BALANCE OF REDUCTIONS DURING FIRST PHASE WOULD BE RELATIVELY FAVORABLE TO THEIR POINT OF VIEW OR MIGHT INSIST ON EQUAL PERCENTAGE CUTS IN SECOND STAGE AS WELL.

8. NETHERLANDS REP (BUWALDA) APPROVED U.S. MANDATE FOR SPC WORK BUT STRESSED THAT MEANS MUST BE FOUND TO ENSURE FULL MILITARY INPUT TO THIS WORK. HE ALSO WELCOMED U.S. PAPER OF JULY 27, PARTICULARLY FOR ITS SIMPLE, STRAIGHTFORWARD CONCEPTION, AND FOUND UK PAPER USEFUL FOR ITS DISCUSSION OF EASTERN AND WESTERN PURPOSES IN MBFR. BELGIAN PAPER, HE SAID, MAY GO TOO FAR INTO

NATURE OF SECOND PHASE. HE JOINED CANADIANS IN STRESSING NEED FOR AGREED DATA BASE AND SUGGESTED THAT CONCEPT OF COMBAT CAPABILITY, WHILE USEFUL, WAS INHERENTLY TOO COMPLICATED TO USE IN NEGOTIATIONS. IN ANY CASE, HE POINTED OUT THAT U.S. PAPER ACKNOWLEDGED COMBAT CAPABILITY BY STRESSING REDUCTIONS IN SOVIET TANKS. ON TERMINOLOGY, BUWALDA SUGGESTED USE OF TERMS "U.S. AND NON-U.S. NATO" AND "SOVIET AND NON-SOVIET WARSAW PACT" WHICH HE SAID ELIMINATED COMPLICATIONS CAUSED BY EUROPEAN STATIONED AND INDIGENOUS FORCES. WHILE SUBSCRIBING TO COMMON CEILING AS GOAL AND FRAMEWORK FOR NEGOTIATIONS, HE AGAIN ASKED WHETHER ALLIES SHOULD ADVANCE CONCEPT EARLY IN TALKS. PREMATURE USE OF THIS CONCEPT, HE SAID, COULD BRING ALLIES INTO DISCUSSION OF SECOND PHASE DURING EARLY PART OF FIRST PHASE WHEN IT WOULD NOT BE
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NEGOTIATED. NOTING RUMSFELD'S CONFIRMATION AT AUGUST 1 MEETING (USNATO 3646) THAT U.S. INTENDED USE SOVIET CONCEPT OF "EQUALITY," BUWALDA CAUTIONED THAT SOVIETS APPARENTLY USED TERM TO MEAN

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EQUALITY IN REDUCTIONS. ON CONSTRAINTS, BUWALDA CALLED ATTENTION TO SACEUR'S RISK ASSESSMENT ON APRIL 30 U.S. PAPER, WHICH ARGUED IN FAVOR OF INCLUDING THREE WESTERN SOVIET MILITARY DISTRICTS IN CONSTRAINTS ZONE AND REPEATED DUTCH SUPPORT FOR THIS IDEA. HE SAID UK SUGGESTION THAT CONSTRAINTS MIGHT BE PLACED ON FORCES

RATHER THAN ON TERRITORY MERITED FURTHER CONSIDERATION, AND EXPRESSED DOUBTS THAT FIRST PHASE CONSTRAINTS SHOULD APPLY TO ANY OTHER THAN SOVIET AND U.S. FORCES. WHILE AGREEING THAT NATIONAL MEANS OF VERIFICATION MIGHT BE SUFFICIENT FOR FIRST PHASE, WHEN ONLY U.S. AND SOVIET FORCES INVOLVED, BUWALDA CAUTIONED THAT THIS COULD HAVE BAD EFFECT OF SETTING PRECEDENT FOR SECOND PHASE. HE EXPRESSED SYMPATHY FOR U.S. DESIRE AVOID GOING INTO SECOND PHASE IN DETAIL AT THIS TIME, BUT ARGUED THAT "BROAD CONSENSUS" ON NATURE OF SECOND PHASE WAS NEEDED SOON, ALTHOUGH NOT NECESSARILY PRIOR TO OCTOBER 30. WHILE HE SAID DUTCH DID NOT GO AS FAR AS FRG IN INSISTING ON LINK BETWEEN FIRST AND SECOND PHASES, HE SAID THE HAGUE BELIEVED IT ESSENTIAL TO ESTABLISH DURING FIRST PHASE THAT THERE WOULD BE SECOND PHASE COVERING INDIGENOUS FORCES. BUWALDA
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SAID THE HAGUE ALSO SYMPATHIZED WITH U.S. INTEREST IN POSSIBLE INTRODUCTION OF MIXED PACKAGE ELEMENTS DURING FIRST PHASE AND WITH U.S. DESIRE GET NEGOTIATING PROPOSAL ON TABLE EARLY IN TALKS. ON LATTER POINT, HE SUGGESTED, HOWEVER, THAT IF INITIAL DISCUSSIONS SHOWED THAT WARSAW PACT NOT PREPARED, IT WOULD BE UNPRODUCTIVE TO TABLE PROPOSAL WHICH THEY WOULD REJECT AT OUTSET BUT MIGHT BE MORE FAVORABLE TOWARD IF IT WERE PRESENTED LATER. HE CONCLUDED, HOWEVER, BY STATING THAT DUTCH WOULD NOT RESIST U.S. DESIRE TABLE NEGOTIATING PROPOSAL EARLY IN TALKS, IF ALL OTHERS AGREED, BUT SUGGESTED THAT PROPOSAL SHOULD BE COUCHED IN VERY GENERAL TERMS.

9. GREEK REP (MOLYVIATIS) ECHOED ERALP'S CONCERNS ABOUT POSITION OF FLANKS, WHICH HE SAID SHOULD BE HANDLED BY SPECIAL AGREEMENT WITH SOVIETS "ON LIMITATIONS ON MOVEMENTS AND VERIFICATION MEASURES." MOLYVIATIS ALSO EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT INCLUSION OF MIXED PACKAGE ELEMENTS COULD RESULT IN DEGRADATION OF NUCLEAR DETERRENT. NOTING THAT HE WAS WITHOUT SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS, NORWEGIAN REP (KRISTVIK) VOICED STRONG SUPPORT FOR GENERAL OUTLINES OF U.S. JULY 27 PAPER AND SPECIFICALLY FOR U.S. VIEW THAT ALLIED NEGOTIATION PROPOSAL SHOULD BE TABLED EARLY IN TALKS. KRISTVIK ALSO SUPPORTED ERALP'S REMARKS ON FLANK INTERESTS AND STRESSED NEED OBTAIN MILITARY INPUT IN FURTHER STUDIES.

10. UK REP (THOMSON) EXPRESSED PLEASURE THAT HIS COMMENTS AT JULY 30 NAC ON CONVERGENCIES BETWEEN U.S. AND UK POSITIONS HAD BEEN SUPPORTED BY U.S. VIEWS PRESENTED AT TODAY'S MEETING. REPLYING TO QUESTIONS RAISED BY RUMSFELD, THOMSON HAD FOLLOWING COMMENTS:

A) TO QUESTION PARA 4, REF A, REGARDING ALLIED AGREEMENT THAT 10 PERCENT CUTS COULD BE MADE WITHOUT ENDANGERING ALLIED SECURITY, THOMSON POINTED OUT THAT PARA 10 OF GUIDELINES SIMPLY SAID REDUCTIONS SHOULD NOT EXCEED 10 PERCENT. HE SAID HE WAS NOT SURE THIS MEANT THAT 10 PERCENT CUTS WERE NECESSARILY ACCEPTABLE. AS TO DATA BASE, THOMSON SAID UK FOUND U.S. PAPER OF JULY 27 ACCURATE "AS FAR AS IT GOES," BUT SAID U.S. PAPER ALSO INDICATED POSSIBILITY OF ADDING ON NUCLEAR COMPONENT (I.E., LARGER WESTERN CUTS) AND POINTED OUT THAT PARAS 2 AND 20 OF U.S. PAPER STRESSED

NEED FOR ALLIED FLEXIBILITY. THOMSON SAID HE SHARED CONCERNS
VOICED BY NETHERLANDS REP AT AUGUST 1 MEETING REGARDING ASYMMETRIES
IN U.S. PROPOSAL, WHICH HE SAID WERE SO LARGE AS TO MAKE THEM
DIFFICULT TO SELL EVEN TO WESTERN PUBLIC OPINION. HE ALSO
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EXPRESSED DOUBT THAT SOVIETS WOULD ACCEPT SITUATION IN WHICH
THEIR REDUCTIONS WERE SPECIFIED WHILE U.S. WAS ALLOWED DISTRIBUTE
ITS CUTS AS IT WISHES. THOMSON ALSO MAINTAINED THAT, AS POINTED
OUT IN SACEUR RISK ASSESSMENT, MBFR WAS ON-GOING PROCESS AND
ALLIES SHOULD LOOK BEYOND OPENING PROPOSAL TO "SLIPPERY SLOPE"
AHEAD.

B) TO QUESTION IN PARA 6, REF A, THOMSON SAID UK AGREED THAT
MANPOWER WAS A BASIC CONSIDERATION IN MBFR REDUCTIONS BUT NOT ONLY
CONSIDERATION.

11. THOMSON NOTED THAT HE HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED CALL ATTENTION TO
FOLLOWING POINTS OF CONVERGENCE BETWEEN U.S. AND UK PAPERS:
A) BOTH PAPERS CALL FOR CONSTRAINTS ONLY ON U.S. AND SOVIET FORCES
DURING FIRST PHASE; B) YARDSTICK USED IN DETERMINING EXTENT OF
REDUCTIONS SHOULD COVER BOTH NUMBERS AND COMBAT CAPABILITY;
C) BOTH PUT CUTS IN EUROPEAN FORCES OFF UNTIL SECOND PHASE; AND
D) BOTH STRESS NEED MAINTAIN FLEXIBILITY, BUT THOMSON AGREED THAT
ON QUESTION OF WHEN NEGOTIATING PROPOSAL SHOULD BE TABLED U.S.
PAPER "BECOMES LESS FLEXIBLE." MAJOR DIFFERENCE BETWEEN TWO PAPERS,
THOMSON SAID, WAS IN U.S. PAPER'S PROPOSAL TO ADVANCE CONCEPT OF
704,000 MAN COMMON CEILING. HE SAID THIS WOULD CREATE LOGICAL
NEED FOR SECOND PHASE, WHICH UK DID NOT BELIEVE WAS IN ALLIED
INTEREST. THOMSON ALSO STRESSED NEED FOR AGREED DATA BASE AS SOON
AS POSSIBLE AND IN ANY EVENT PRIOR TO MID-SEPTEMBER. IN CONCLUSION,
THOMSON SAID UK SAW THREE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF FURTHER MBFR WORK
PROGRAM: 1) RESOLVE DIFFERENCES ON SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES;
2) ENSURE THAT WORK GOES ON IN TANDEM ON SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES AND
TACTICAL APPROACH; AND 3) ENSURE THAT MILITARY VIEWS ARE GIVEN
FULL EXPRESSION. ON THIS BASIS AND ON BASIS RUMSFELD'S
ASSURANCE THAT OUR MANDATE DID NOT SEEK PREJUDGE SPC WORK,
THOMSON SAID HE COULD AGREE TO U.S. MANDATE. (COMMENT:
RUMSFELD AND DELOFFS DISCUSSED ISSUES PRIVATELY WITH THOMSON,
WHO INDICATED DESIRE BE HELPFUL DURING COMING WORK. END COMMENT.)

12. MILITARY COMMITTEE REP (GENERAL STEINHOFF) PRESENTED SOME
PRELIMINARY MC COMMENTS ON U.S. PAPER OF JULY 27, NOTING THAT ALL
THREE SUBSTANTIVE PAPERS UNDER CAREFUL REVIEW AND THAT FURTHER
MILITARY COMMENTS WOULD BE SUBMITTED SOON. STEINHOFF CONCENTRATED
ON DATA ON SOVIET FORCES USED IN LATEST U.S. PAPER, WHICH HE SAID
HE DID NOT FIND UNREASONABLE PER SE BUT NOTED WAS EVEN MORE
"GLOOMY" THAN NATO MILITARY FIGURES. FREQUENT CHANGES IN DATA
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BASE, STEINHOFF ARGUED, POINTED OUT DIFFICULTY OF BEING PRECISE

ON NUMBERS. FOR THIS REASON AND BECAUSE OF GREAT IMPORTANCE OF
OVERALL STRENGTH, NUMBERS SHOULD BE SECOND CRITERION USED IN
REACHING POSITION ON REDUCTIONS PACKAGE AND COMBAT CAPABILITY
SHOULD BE FIRST. HE ADMITTED THAT NUMBERS WERE USEFUL WITH

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PUBLIC, HOWEVER. ON FURTHER WORK, STEINHOFF MADE EXPECTED PITCH
FOR ACTIVE NATO MILITARY ROLE IN SPC DISCUSSIONS.

13. SUMMING UP, PANSA NOTED THAT DISCUSSION HAD BEEN EXTREMELY
USEFUL AND HAD SERVED TO DEMONSTRATE SUBSTANTIAL AREAS OF
AGREEMENT AMONG ALLIES. AREAS OF DISAGREEMENT WERE ALSO CLEAR,
HE SAID, PARTICULARLY ON LINK BETWEEN FIRST AND SECOND PHASES
AND ON ALLIED APPROACH AT OPENING OF FIRST PHASE. AFTER SOME
DISCUSSION, COUNCIL AGREED THAT SPC WOULD BEGIN WORK AUGUST 7,
WITH IT GENERALLY UNDERSTOOD THAT U.S. MANDATE WOULD SERVE AS
FRAMEWORK FOR SPC DISCUSSION. SPC WILL DETERMINE MANNER IN
WHICH NATO PROFESSIONAL MILITARY VIEWS WILL BE BROUGHT TO BEAR ON
DISCUSSION, INCLUDING POSSIBLE ROLE OF MBFR WORKING GROUP.
SHOULD SPC BE UNABLE RESOLVE THESE PROCEDURAL ISSUES, IT WILL
REFER THEM TO COUNCIL, WHICH OTHERWISE WILL NOT MEET DURING WEEK
OF AUGUST 6.

14. COMMENT: AS INDICATED ABOVE, THERE WAS CONSIDERABLE SUPPORT
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AT MEETING FOR ADDITIONAL WORK IN REFINING DATA BASE AND SEVERAL DELEGATIONS PROPOSED THAT THIS TASK BE ENTRUSTED TO MBFR WORKING GROUP. WE BELIEVE THAT THESE PROPOSALS REFLECT GENUINE CONCERN OVER POSSIBILITY THAT ALLIES MIGHT ENTER NEGOTIATIONS WITHOUT FIRM AGREEMENT ON BASIC FIGURES. WE BELIEVE THAT WASHINGTON SHOULD CONSIDER HOW WE CAN EASE ALLIES' CONCERN OVER THIS PROBLEM BY PROVIDING DESCRIPTION AND EXPLANATION OF METHODOLOGY WHICH WE USED IN REACHING THE FIGURES WHICH WERE PRESENTED IN OUR LATEST PROPOSAL. ALSO SEE USNATO 3670 ON SAME SUBJECT. END COMMENT.

RUMSFELD

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<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 02 APR 1999
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: n/a
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 03 AUG 1973
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: hilburpw
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1973NATO03687
Document Source: ADS
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: 1165) GDS
Errors: n/a
Film Number: n/a
From: NATO
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
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Legacy Key: link1973/newtext/t19730868/abqcebmi.tel
Line Count: 501
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE
Office: n/a
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 10
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: A) STATE 152826; B) STATE 152750
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: hilburpw
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 14 AUG 2001
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <14-Aug-2001 by kelleyw0>; APPROVED <06-Sep-2001 by hilburpw>
Review Markings:

Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
30 JUN 2005

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: MBFR - AUGUST 3 COUNCIL DISCUSSION OF SUBSTANTIVE ASPECTS
TAGS: PARM, NATO
To: STATE
SECDEF INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS
USCINCEUR
USNMR SHAPE
Type: TE
Markings: Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005